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INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAW IMPROVEMENTS
FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS
JoHN Q. BARRETT*
I am a bit like the guy in the Hertz rent-a-car commercial. Our topic is
"Should the Independent Counsel Law Be Renewed?" and my answer is,
"Not exactly." I will not be, in other words, defending the status quo. In-
deed, the empty chair you see here on the dais nicely contains the only "de-
fender" of the status quo of whom I know.
What I would like to do is remind us of the original rationale for the In-
dependent Counsel statute,' for that rationale is still valid and compelling
today. I will then address some ways to improve the statute and some of
the reasons why continuing it with modifications is preferable to the path of
abandoning it.
LOOKING BEHIND THE DASH
Let me begin by talking about something we can call the problem of "the
dash." This has nothing to do with Professor Sam Dash, who is one of the
founding fathers of the Independent Counsel law.2 This dash, rather, is a
* Assistant Professor, St. John's University School of Law. A.B. Georgetown Uni-
versity, 1983, J.D. Harvard University, 1986. E-mail: <jbarrett@sjulawfac.stjohns.edu>.
This Article is adapted from remarks that I made in New Orleans on January 8, 1999,
as part of an Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Administrative Law Section
panel discussion entitled, "Separation of Powers Revisited: Should the Independent Counsel
Law Be Renewed?" Thanks to Eleanor Kinney, Thomas Sargentich, and David Strauss for
the opportunity to participate in the New Orleans Panel and their thoughtful comments dur-
ing the discussion, and to Jean M. Lucido (SJU Law '00) for research assistance. Although
I served as Associate Counsel in the Office of Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh
from 1988 to 1993, this Article reflects solely my own views.
1. 28 U.S.C §§ 591-99 (1994). President Clinton signed the Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1994 into law on June 30, 1994. See President's Statement on
Signing the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act, 1 PuB. PAPERS 1169 (June 30, 1994);
30 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1383 (June 30, 1994).
2. See S. REP. No. 93-981, at 96-100 (1974) (The Final Report of the Select Commit-
tee on Presidential Campaign Activities) (recommending establishment of"a permanent Of-
fice of Public Attorney," headed by a Public Attorney who would be chosen by the judici-
ary, subject to Senate confirmation and appointed for a fixed term, with "jurisdiction to
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story, an introductory device, that you may have heard at a funeral or read
in an obituary essay, for it seems to be a common introduction to personal
and detailed eulogies for the deceased.
The focus of the dash story is a basic gravestone.3 When you look at
such a grave marker, you see only the name of the deceased, his date of
birth and his date of death. Between those two dates, you see the dash.
And, of course, that is where all the action was. The detailed fullness of
the person's life occurred in that space between his birth and his death, and
the simple dash on the stone tells you nothing at all about how that life was
lived. To learn about the life in its detail and complexity, you will need
more than the basic dates of commencement and conclusion. You will
need to look, in effect, behind the dash.
As we consider the Independent Counsel statute, which will lapse in
June 1999 unless it is reenacted in some form,4 we resemble the relatives,
friends, acquaintances, and students of the departed Independent Counsel
who served under the statute since its first enactment in 1978. They were
the embodiments of the law, and so we look to their markers to assess what
their work tells us about the law itself. And as a political and government
culture, we are, in 1999, finally looking at, and behind, the dash, which is
the hard part.
prosecute criminal cases in which there is a real or apparent conflict of interest within the
executive branch"). Professor Dash served as Chief Counsel to this Committee.
3. This story appears to originate in "The Dash," a poem that Alton Maiden, a former
Notre Dame student and football defensive tackle, was inspired to write by his team's visit
to a 12th century cemetery in Ireland. See Lou HOLTZ, WINNING EVERY DAY: THE GAME
PLAN FOR SUCCESS 166-67 (1998) (quoting Maiden's poem).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994) (providing that Independent Counsel Reauthorization
Act of 1994 "shall cease to be effective five years after [its] date of enactment," which was
June 30, 1994). The current law does provide, however, that the Act "shall continue in ef-
fect with respect to then pending matters before an Independent Counsel that in the judg-
ment of such counsel require such continuation until that Independent Counsel determines
such matters have been completed." Id. The currently known Independent Counsel who
thus may continue in their work even if the statute expires on June 30, 1999, are David M.
Barrett (In re Henry G. Cisneros), Carol Elder Bruce (In re Bruce Edward Babbitt), Ralph I.
Lancaster, Jr. (In re Alexis M Herman), Donald C. Smaltz (In re Alphonso Michael (Mike)
Espy) and Kenneth W. Starr (In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association, In re
Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association (Webster L. Hubbell), In re Madison Guar-
anty Savings & Loan Association (In re William David Watkins), In re Madison Guaranty
Savings & Loan Association (In re Anthony Marceca), In re Madison Guaranty Savings &
Loan Association (In re Bernard Nussbaum), and In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan
Association [Monica Lewinsky]). In 1992 and thereafter, the three Independent Counsel
who then were in business, Arlin M. Adams (In re Samuel Pierce), Joseph diGenova (In re
Janet G. Mullins) and Lawrence E. Walsh (In re Oliver L. North), similarly continued their
work under an equivalent grandfathering provision in the 1987 Independent Counsel law.
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In the previous phases of reconsidering the Independent Counsel law, we
have looked at the other parts of the basic marker. At the beginning of this
statute in 1978, the post-Watergate perspective looked at something that
was done. It looked at the completed work of Watergate Special Prosecu-
tors Archibald Cox, Leon Jaworski, Henry Ruth and Charles Ruff, at Wa-
tergate as a finished product. This evaluation looked, in other words, at the
end date on the Watergate marker. It also looked ahead to the next time, to
the next beginning date when we would need a credible alternative to the
next John Mitchell or Richard Kleindienst or L. Patrick Gray. This evalua-
tion also anticipated, in other words, the next birth date of a credible, inde-
pendent investigator of alleged executive branch criminality. The legisla-
tive history, beginning in 1973, of what became the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978 is filled with discussion of the need for special prosecutor ap-
pointments in certain circumstances - the need for something else to be
born. That really was the philosophy of many of the legislative founders of
this statute. There was very little realistic discussion about how their work
would occur - the rich stuff that would, in those cases, occur behind the
dash.
In the next generation, the statute was reauthorized twice, in 1982 and
again in 1987.5 On each occasion, the 1980s perspective on the statute
again looked more at dates of commencement and conclusion than at, and
behind, the dash. Congress looked back on some of the Independent Coun-
sel appointments that had commenced and been concluded during the pre-
ceding five years, and they were generally accepted as successful investi-
gations. These were, in other words, dates of death, completed events.
Congress also, as it had leading up to the initial enactment of the statute in
1978, looked forward in 1982 and again in 1987 by anticipating the next
occasion on which the country would need an Independent Counsel ap-
pointment. It looked ahead, in other words, to anticipated dates of birth
that might occur at some points during the law's next five years.
Even the 1994 legislative process that culminated in the passage of the
Independent Counsel law we have today involved, although to a lesser ex-
tent than the previous congressional deliberations, the same kind of looking
ahead to the possibility that we might need an Independent Counsel during
the life of that law.6
5. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat.
2039 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1994)); Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1994)).
6. See, e.g., The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 24
before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 11-33 (1993) (testimony of
Hon. Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice).
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But what we have now, in 1999, is a look at the dash. This was some-
what true in 1992, 1993, and 1994, when the statute had expired and
needed to be reauthorized and the Clinton administration supported it, but it
is completely true now. Today we are in the midst of considering a wide
range of very complicated, highly divisive operational issues that have
arisen in investigations and prosecutions that have occurred under the In-
dependent Counsel statute. That is the framework for our discussion: we
are looking behind the dash. Now, frankly, it was there all along, and we
were naive and superficial in our discussion of this statute to the extent that
we focused only on concluded, successful independent investigations and
others that were anticipated but not yet born. We should have looked at,
and behind, the dash that represents the work of Independent Counsel much
more from the very beginning of our consideration of this concept. But at
least we are facing it now.
THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAW
Now let us go back to basics. What are the rationales for this statute,
from 1973, when the idea was born; in 1978, when the statute was born;
and forward?
The starting point involves the lessons of 1973. In that year of Water-
gate, there was, first, actual executive interference with law enforcement.
That was our experience, most tangibly, in the Saturday Night Massacre: a
President firing a prosecutor because the prosecutor was getting too close,
or doing too well, in investigating corruption at the highest levels of gov-
ernment. Actual executive interference with law enforcement also was pre-
sent in the White House claims of executive privilege during Watergate,
both against Cox and the Watergate grand jury in 1973, resulting in the
Massacre, and also against Jaworski and the conspiracy prosecution in
1974, resulting in the Supreme Court's decision in the United States v.
Nixon.7 That was real, live, tangible and, in a view that I think is by now
almost unanimous, improper executive interference with law enforcement.
The other lesson of 1973 that led to the founding of this statute was the
appearance that the United States Department of Justice gave partial law
enforcement, favoritism, and less than aggressive scrutiny to President
Nixon and his men. Many would say that is what happened at the United
States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia in its initial investiga-
tion of the Watergate burglary. Others would point to the conduit of in-
formation that ran from the Criminal Division in Main Justice - literally
from the desk of the Assistant Attorney General, Henry Peterson - di-
rectly to President Nixon at the White House. The prosecutors would pres-
7. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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ent witnesses and other evidence to the grand jury. The prosecutors also
would tell their supervisors about how the Watergate investigation was
progressing. The information would reach Peterson. And Peterson would,
in some key instances, share that information with Nixon. Guess what kind
of climate that created, what kind of restraint and chill that put on would-be
witnesses and the prosecutors and investigators who were working to ob-
tain their full cooperation and truthful testimony?
Those were parts of the lessons of Watergate, but in passing the first In-
dependent Counsel law in 1978 we drew some broader conclusions that
were right then and are right now. The statute was enacted to address two
basic needs. The first was the need for an investigator who would have
actual independence and power when he was conducting a criminal inves-
tigation of the President of the United States or one of his most intimate as-
sociates. The statute embodied what may be no more than a gut level un-
derstanding that is widely shared by people who have worked in federal
law enforcement: the pressures and the divided loyalties that come with
doing this kind of investigation while employed by the Attorney General
and located in the Department of Justice are too much for any man or
woman. That was Professor Archibald Cox's description in 1975 of the
actual conflict of interest that comes if we leave such investigations in the
Department of Justice setting.8 It is a conflict that is likely, tangible, and
powerful. The statute recognized that by permitting an alternative.
The second need that the statute was enacted to address is the need for
public trust in government law enforcement. At the start of a major crimi-
nal investigation of, say, a President, the public is entitled to ask and will
ask whether the appointed investigator is credible to do the job. And dur-
ing the course of the investigation, the public is entitled to ask and will ask
whether the investigator is proceeding with sufficient vigor, 1horoughness,
even-handedness and freedom from outside pressure. Those are legitimate
questions and the Independent Counsel law was enacted to provide some
basis for the public to answer those questions in the affirmative.
As we look at the law's coming expiration in 1999, we should remember
the history of its enactment, because right now everything or nothing is on
the table. The first legislative initiative, right after the Saturday Night
Massacre, was an effort to restore the fired Archibald Cox or to put another
special prosecutor in his place, in charge of the Watergate investigation. At
that time, the idea was born quickly that this special prosecutor should be
appointed by judges rather than by the Attorney General. The initiative
quickly changed, once Acting Attorney General Robert Bork appointed
8. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and
S. 2978 before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong. 200 (1974) (testimony of Archibald Cox).
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Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski and the Watergate investigation re-
sumed,9 to a proposal to allow courts to appoint these kinds of prosecutors,
or these kinds of investigators, in the future. And that is the general con-
cept that got enacted in 1978 and reenacted on three subsequent occasions.
A third alternative, which was rejected in that initial phase and never
really has been considered seriously in the legislative debates since then, is
a statute that would create a permanent special prosecutor. In Judge Bork's
evocative phrase, this would be the "wolf hanging on the flank of the
elk."'0 I think that is a good executive branch perspective. Some think that
is what this statute has transmogrified into as we have come to have so
many Independent Counsel, but a permanent office is a formal alternative
to consider. It would have a structure, a staff, a budget, and maybe, com-
peting demands on its limited time and resources. I think my colleagues on
the panel will speak about some of these issues. The arguments about the
merits and dangers of such an office certainly should continue."
THE SUCCESSES OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAW
Now let me talk about the successes of the law. You may have forgotten
them - many people today do not notice, or even know about, the law's
successes. I can only make a few brief points here, but this statute has a
tremendous track record of success.
Over the twenty-plus years of its existence, the Independent Counsel law
has vindicated the public trust rationale that led to its enactment. The law
is not without its bumps and flaws, but at every point the availability of this
alternative mechanism to an Attorney General-led, Department of Justice-
conducted investigation of senior executive branch officials has enhanced
public confidence, and I think it continues to have that value.
In addition, the uses of the law in different types of cases have .been
more or less successful. Consider a spectrum of three types of Independent
Counsel investigations.
9. Remarks of Acting Attorney General Robert H. Bork Announcing His Appoint-
ment of Leon Jaworski, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1303 (Nov. 1, 1973); accord 38 Fed.
Reg. 30,738 (1973).
10. Special Prosecutor and Watergate Grand Jury Legislation: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.J Res. 784 and
H.R. 10937, 93d Cong. 263 (1973) (testimony of Robert H. Bork).
II. Let me recommend at this point Professor Ken Gormley's recent Michigan Law
Review article on the original intent, the original model, of the Independent Counsel statute.
See Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REv.
601 (1998). It traces this legislative process in great detail and explains how we got to what
we chose and why we did not choose these alternative statutory schemes. See id. at 609-12,
617-26.
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One type is the "covered person, discrete conduct" investigation. "Cov-
ered persons" are the executive branch officials from the president on down
and others who are, by virtue of their government positions or other ties to
the president, covered by the investigative procedures of the Independent
Counsel law when allegations that they have committed crimes come to
light.' 2 An example of a "covered person, discrete conduct" case was the
1980 allegation that Timothy Kraft once snorted cocaine in Studio 54.
Would we trust Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti and the Carter De-
partment of Justice to investigate the guy who was running the Carter re-
election campaign in 1980, or would we prefer a law that allowed the At-
torney General to hand that responsibility to somebody else? The Kraft
case went to an Independent Counsel, who, after conducting some investi-
gation, indicated that the allegation was of no merit, had no factual basis,
and closed it.
13
Those are the easiest Independent Counsel cases. We forget about them
because they come and they go and they are successes, not national crises.
But they are part of the track record under this statute.
A second category of cases where Independent Counsel have been ap-
pointed are "covered person, sprawling conduct" cases. These are more
complicated because they involve more than one incident on one night in
one discotheque. They involve allegations such as tax evasion. For in-
stance, an Independent Counsel was appointed once to investigate a senior
Department of Justice official, someone working right under an Attorney
General, for alleged tax evasion. It is a reported case that has now been
long forgotten - there is no reason even to mention the man's name -
because this investigation was handled credibly by an investigator outside
the Department of Justice.
A third category, sitting at the low end of anyone's success spectrum, is
obviously what we are preoccupied with right now: a "covered President"
case. In our national life, these investigations are just different. They
demonstrate exactly the point of the story of the dash: every presidency,
and certainly every credible allegation that a president has engaged in
criminal conduct, will be a matter of great richness, fullness, messiness and
political contention. Those matters will be hard fought, visible, political
issues. Whatever the Independent Counsel actually does in his or her bun-
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(l)-(7) (specifying persons as to whom the Attorney General
must conduct a preliminary investigation under the Independent Counsel law when she re-
ceives information that is sufficient grounds to investigate whether they have committed a
significant federal crime).
13. See Edward T. Pound, US. Closes Inquiry on Ex-Carter Aide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
25, 1981, at Al.
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ker to investigate such allegations, the external world will have a hard time
with those cases, and that is the richness of the dash.
Now let me give you a more recent example that illustrates each cate-
gory:
First category, "covered person, discrete conduct": An Independent
Counsel investigated Eli Segal. He ran the Americorps program under
President Clinton, the domestic Peace Corps, while also running a non-
governmental foundation that provided financial support for those same
activities. Mr. Segal's dual roles raised criminal questions under federal
conflict of interest statutes. In a very quiet way, that allegation came to the
attention of Attorney General Reno. She requested the appointment of an
Independent Counsel and the Special Division picked a former Judge,
Curtis Emery von Kann, for the appointment. He did the investigative job
fast, declined to prosecute Mr. Segal, and went out of business.
Second category, "covered person, sprawling conduct": In re Samuel
Pierce. This investigation seems to get some bad mention in passing be-
cause it took a long time and because a district judge basically held it open,
although dormant - one attorney, one desk, one telephone - for its last
two years. But this case involved a covered person, President Reagan's
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and a range of HUD
programs and employees who allegedly were involved in criminal activity.
As the investigations went forward, the Independent Counsel found crimi-
nality in a lot of other places and prosecuted quite a few of those cases.
That Independent Counsel work is now done, and the final report that is a
matter of public record shows quite responsible federal prosecutorial be-
havior, quite legitimate decisions to indict and quite successful trial out-
comes. The investigation did spread widely. It may deserve criticism for
not snipping off some of its farthest branches and tossing those tendrils
back to the Department of Justice for its handling. 4 But in general, the
Pierce case - a covered Cabinet officer and related persons, involved in a'
wide range of conduct - came to a successful and credible outcome
through the Independent Counsel's work.' 5
14. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 594(d)(1) (authorizing Independent Counsel to "request
assistance from the Department of Justice in carrying out the functions of the Independent
Counsel" and directing that the Department "shall provide that assistance, which may in-
clude . . . the use of the resources and personnel necessary to perform such Independent
Counsel's duties"); 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(l)(A) (authorizing an Independent Counsel, as part
of notifying the Attorney General that his work has been substantially completed, to refer
matters back to the Department of Justice for "complet[ion]").
15. See generally Arlin M. Adams & Larry D. Thompson, Final Report of the Inde-
pendent Counsel In re Samuel R. Pierce, Jr. (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. Oct. 27, 1998) (Div. No.
89-5).
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The third category is, again, "covered President" cases. In this area, one
success of the Independent Counsel statute is the case I know best, In re
Oliver L. North. It turned out to be a "covered President and covered
Cabinet" case, even though it was named after the poor "fall guy.' 6 From
the start, Iran/Contra was destined to be one of those hard fought, messy
cases. As history now knows, it was handled properly, it was litigated re-
sponsibly, and it was concluded successfully. Those outcomes are, in part,
a testament to the statute that made them possible.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES REGARDING THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAW
I now will turn to some of the criticisms of the Independent Counsel law.
One realm of serious criticism and ongoing argumentation involves the
constitutionality of the law itself. More than ten years after the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel law in Mor-
rison v. Olson,17 subjects of Independent Counsel investigations, defen-
dants in Independent Counsel prosecutions, criminals who were prosecuted
successful by Independent Counsel and others continue to raise a wide
range of constitutional arguments.
Although most of the constitutional arguments against the law were re-
solved by Morrison or by reasonable implications that can be drawn from
the Court's decision, I will flag two of the current constitutional arguments
that are, in my view, real ones. One specific issue is the constitutionality of
the law's provision that allows Independent Counsel to obtain expansions
of their prosecutorial jurisdiction directly from the Special Division, with-
out the support of the Attorney General.' 8 This scenario begins, in other
words, with an Attorney General triggering the appointment of an Inde-
pendent Counsel to handle a defined area of investigative responsibility.
Sometime later, the Independent Counsel wants to go, as an investigator or
as - prosecutor, beyond the border of his jurisdictional box. But the Attor-
ney General does not agree with that desire and she will not ask the Special
Division to expand the Independent Counsel's jurisdiction. Under the stat-
ute, the Independent Counsel can go to the court and from it get the ex-
panded jurisdiction.' 9
16. See I LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FNAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR
IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS xiii-xiv, xv, xvii-xviii (1993) (Executive Summary).
17. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(e) ("An Independent Counsel may ask the Attorney General or
the division of the court to refer to the Independent Counsel matters related to the Independ-
ent Counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction, and the Attorney General or the division of the
court, as the case may be, may refer such matters.").
19. See id.
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In my view, that scenario raises a serious separation of powers issue. It
involves members of the judicial branch conferring a core executive power,
additional power to prosecute, on an Independent Counsel without any ex-
ecutive branch involvement except for the attorney general's original trig-
gering of the Independent Counsel appointment. Although this issue has
narrowly avoided adjudication in Independent Counsel Donald Smaltz's
prosecution of Ronald H. Blackley, Sr., who once was the Chief of Staff to
Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy,20 a Special Division order that ex-
panded an Independent Counsel's jurisdiction might be constitutionally
doomed. Congress should, when it considers reenacting an Independent
Counsel statute, delete this provision and make clear that the only source of
Independent Counsel jurisdiction should be a request from the Attorney
General.
A second constitutional issue that is less tangible but well worth consid-
ering is the "inferiority" question. What made the Independent Counsel
constitutional under the Appointments Clause 21 in Morrison was the
Court's conclusion that, at least at the beginning and the end, appointment
and removal, the Attorney General is still the boss of an Independent Coun-
20. In September 1994, the Special Division, acting in response to Attorney General
Reno's request, appointed Independent Counsel Smaltz to investigate alleged crimes by
Espy, who then was the Secretary of Agriculture, and others. See <http://www.oic.gov/
wwwroot/myweb/smaltz/app.htm> (containing text of Order Appointing Independent Coun-
sel, In re Alphonso Michael (Mike) Espy (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. Sept. 9, 1994) (per curiam)
(Div. No. 94-2)) (Smaltz office web site, visited Feb. 27, 1999). Smaltz later asked the At-
torney General to act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 594(e) to refer to him, as a matter related to
his original prosecutorial jurisdiction, jurisdiction to investigate alleged crimes by Blackley.
When Attorney General Reno denied this request, Smaltz asked the Special Division to use
its authority under section 594(e) to refer the Blackley matter to Smaltz for investigation.
Attorney General Reno filed an objection to this request. On April 1, 1996, the Special Divi-
sion, explaining that it was "interpreting, but not expanding, the Independent Counsel's
original prosecutorial jurisdiction," issued an order stating that Smaltz had jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute certain matters involving Blackley. In re Espy, 80 F.3d 501, 507
(D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. 1996). The Special Division found that these Blackley matters were
"'demonstrably related' to the factual circumstances underlying the Attorney General's
original investigation and request for appointment of an Independent Counsel." Id. at 508.
Blackley was subsequently indicted, convicted of three counts of making false statements
and sentenced to 27 months of imprisonment. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed that trial
court's holding that Smaltz's original jurisdiction authorized his investigation and prosecu-
tion of Blackley. See United States v. Blackley, 167 F.3d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff'g 986 F.
Supp. 607, 610 (D.D.C. 1997).
21. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2 ("Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments."). "Inferior Officers" are defined earlier in the clause as "Officers of
the United States[ ] whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for ... " Id.
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sel. The Attorney General triggers the statute,22 and she can fire an Inde-
pendent Counsel who turns out to be a putz.23 (In New York, you can still
use that less-than-polite word if you are not running for office.24) And that
was enough to demonstrate that an Independent Counsel was an "inferior
Officer," and thus to make it constitutional for a court of law to appoint
him.
Professor Akhil Amar recently published an article 25 that considers,
among other topics, the Supreme Court's 1997 Edmond decision26 and
some of Justice Scalia's language therein suggesting a more vigorous Su-
preme Court analysis of what determines whether a federal official is an
inferior Officer under Article 11.27 I think that this is making a lot out of
some language that is merely suggestive and quite general, and that the
Morrison vote of 7 to 1 against Justice Scalia is still more or less where the
Supreme Court is today. Remember that Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, as a
Circuit Judge, wrote the opinion explaining the law's constitutionality that
was vindicated by the Supreme Court majority in Morrison,28 and that Ste-
phen Breyer, as a law professor, endorsed the constitutionality of an early
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)-(c).
23. Actually, the statute authorizes an Attorney General to remove an Independent
Counsel "only by [her] personal action," and "only for good cause, physical disability,
mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such
Independent Counsel's duties." 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1).
24. Cf Robert Hardt, Jr. & Gregg Birnbaum, Al Learns the "Oy" of Yiddish, Takes
Heat After He Calls Foe Schumer "Putzhead, " N.Y. POST, Oct. 22, 1998, at 8.
25. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 902-12 (1998); see
also Akhil Reed Amar The Unimperial Presidency, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 8, 1999, at 25,
27-28; Akhil Reed Amar, Should We Ditch the Independent Prosecutor Law?, Messages #1,
#3 and #5, <http://www.slate.com/dialogues/> (Feb. 16, 17 & 18, 1999) (dialogue with Pro-
fessor Ken Gormley); accord Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The
Court's New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUMBIA L. REv. 1103 (1998).
26. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
27. See id. at 662-63 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., for the Court):
Generally speaking, the term "inferior officer" connotes a relationship with some
higher ranking officer or officers below the President: whether one is an "inferior"
officer depends on whether he has a superior. It is not enough that other officers may
be identified who formally maintain a higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a
greater magnitude. If that were the intention, the Constitution might have used the
phrase "lesser officer." Rather, in the context of a clause designed to preserve politi-
cal accountability relative to important government assignments, we think it evident
that "inferior officers" are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some
level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
Id.
28. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 518-36 (D.C. Cir.) (Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, J.,
dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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bill that proposed a version of what later became the Independent Counsel
29
statute. I do not think that the Supreme Court votes have changed funda-
mentally since 1988, but this question of "inferiority" is worth continued
and careful thought.
BEHAVIORAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAW
There also are behavioral issues for Congress to think about as it consid-
ers whether to reauthorize the Independent Counsel statute. I will list a few
and then talk about my proposals.
The first behavioral issue to reconsider is the conduct of Members of
Congress while an Independent Counsel law is in effect. Some Members
have, in the past, sought to force the Attorney General's hand in the direc-
tion of triggering Independent Counsel appointments in various matters.
Some Members also have, at times, sought to command an Independent
Counsel's investigative and prosecutorial work. These behaviors have
been parts of our experience with the current law, at least in the "covered
President," big headline-type cases, and they generally have not been help-
ful to Attorneys General or Independent Counsel carrying out their law en-
forcement responsibilities under the statute.
A second behavioral issue for everyone to reconsider is the widespread
practice of demonizing an Independent Counsel. At least in the big cases,
the subjects of the Independent Counsel's investigation, their lawyers, their
political allies, their friends and so forth begin, almost from day one, to cast
aspersions on Independent Counsel. Some Independent Counsel have
compounded that problem by making real public relations mistakes. This
kind of criticism is the reality of the messiness of life behind the dash, I
think, but each of us may be able to do small things to clean it up, and thus
to enhance the quality and credibility of any Independent Counsel's work.30
A third spectrum of behavioral issues to think about hard as we consider
whether to let the statute die or to keep it concerns issues about Independ-
ent Counsel conduct. You know this list of particulars; there is no need to
29. See Memorandum by Professors Stephen Breyer & Philip Heymann, Harvard Law
School (analyzing "the constitutionality of a proposal that would vest in the district court the
power to appoint a new independent Special Prosecutor. The Prosecutor would have exclu-
sive authority to investigate and to prosecute a narrowly defined range of criminal offenses;
he would not be subject in any way to control by any other official or agency, including the
President; he would be removable only by the district court and then only for 'extraordinary
improprieties."'), reprinted in Special Prosecutor: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 556-60 pt. 2, (1973) (proceedings of Nov. 15, 1973).
30. See generally John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing, Or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney
General Power, Conduct and Judgment in Relation to the Work of an Independent Counsel,
49 MERCER L. REv. 519, 543-51 (1998).
[51:2
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE
belabor it. There are things that are real misconduct if and when they hap-
pen in any Independent Counsel's office, just as they are when the prose-
cutor who commits these acts works for the Department of Justice:
" leaks of grand jury information;
* charging cases that lack proof, jury appeal and/or prosecutive merit;
* violating other Department of Justice policies that bind any regular
federal prosecutor (which is what an Independent Counsel is sup-
posed to be);
" plain old over-investigating - the proportionality questions about
how hard and how far to go as an investigator, given what it is that
you are chasing;
* profligate spending;
" bad judgment generally; and, finally,
* personal ambition, in an Independent Counsel himself or at the staff
level, that affects conduct of the public's business.
Although each of these behaviors is, if it occurs, deeply problematic,
each is just that: an act of personal behavior, not a command of the Inde-
pendent Counsel law. While the personal failings and mistakes of any In-
dependent Counsel thus are not reasons to abandon the Independent Coun-
sel statute - the Department of Justice, after all, is filled with people, too
- they are things to think about in structuring and improving the law's
processes.
PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAW
I will conclude these remarks by offering a list of some modifications
that would improve the Independent Counsel law. The framework in
which these pieces fit is a general idea that the Attorney General should be
authorized to narrow, lengthen and close, in her discretion, the channel that
leads to the appointment of an Independent Counsel. We should trust the
Attorney General a lot more on the front end of investigations of alleged
crimes by senior executive branch officials, permitting her explicitly to de-
termine whether a matter should travel through that channel. The result of
trusting the Attorney General more probably will be that many fewer mat-
ters will travel to the point where the statute is triggered. Fewer Independ-
ent Counsel will be appointed. But if and when they are appointed, the
statute's delegation to Independent Counsel of the Attorney General's full
investigative power and authority should remain relatively close to what we
have right now. I would add just a few occupational constraints to Inde-
pendent Counsel in operation as federal investigators and prosecutors.
Some proposals that Congress should consider include the following:
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First, Congress should give up the congressional triggers that are built
into the current law. The law currently allows the Senate and House Judi-
ciary Committees, or a majority of either Committee's majority party
members, or a majority of either Committee's non-majority party members,
to send a letter asking the Attorney General to seek an Independent Coun-
sel appointment. 3 The law requires her to report back within thirty days on
what she is doing and why with regard to each matter that Congress called
to her attention.32 You have seen this provision used repeatedly in relation
to the investigation of 1996 campaign financing activities. It has become a
way of jerking the Attorney General's chain. It is not what federal law en-
forcement has to deal with as statutory matter in other contexts, and it may
tempt some Members of Congress not to pursue more formal and detailed
oversight activities regarding the executive branch that are important parts
of the legislature's historical and constitutional role.
Second, Congress should empower the Department of Justice at the pre-
liminary investigation stage, before the trigger is pulled that will result in
an Independent Counsel appointment. 33 Let Department of Justice attor-
neys work with grand juries. Let them use their subpoena powers. Let
Justice plea-bargain. Let it obtain immunity orders that will compel wit-
nesses to testify. If Justice misuses these powers and sabotages or just
blows an investigation of senior government officials, the nation will see it
- and we can talk about that sorry record when the statute up is for
reauthorization the next time. But unless and until a Department of Justice
demonstrates its incapacity to do the initial job right, the law should let
Justice and the Attorney General do what they truly need to do to make the
informed decision that a particular matter really is one of the things that
should, as a matter of national need, travel down the channel to an Inde-
pendent Counsel appointment.
Third, Congress should change the current statute's time limits on De-
partment of Justice preliminary investigations - they now can last only 90
days, 34 which the Attorney General can expand once to 150 days with court
permission35 - into mere notification requirements. In other words, the
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(I) (1994).
32. See id.
33. See id. § 592(a)(2)(A) ("In conducting preliminary investigations under this chap-
ter, the Attorney General shall have no authority to convene grand juries, plea bargain, grant
immunity, or issue subpoenas.").
34. See id. § 592(a)(1). In instances where the preliminary investigation commences
after Members of Congress have asked the Attorney General to seek an Independent Coun-
sel appointment, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, the 90 days begin to run on the
day that she receives the congressional letter and she may not seek an extension of time
from the court, see 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1).
35. See id. § 592(a)(3).
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law should keep the Department of Justice's work somewhat visible, but it
should not create tight drop dead dates that may distort the Attorney Gen-
eral's assessment of whether an Independent Counsel is needed.
Fourth, Congress should change the statutory standard that describes
when the Attorney General should seek an Independent Counsel appoint-
ment. Under the current law, the Attorney General must, in effect, prove a
negative at the end of the preliminary investigation that is limited in dura-
tion and power. Unless she determines that there are "no reasonable
grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted, 36 the current law
requires the Attorney General to ask the special court to appoint an Inde-
pendent Counsel. 37 Leaving aside the epistemological question of whether
you can prove a negative, the tilt toward appointment gets us more Inde-
pendent Counsel than we probably need.
A better statute would tilt the other way. Congress and the President
should allow the Attorney General to work under a statute that directs her
to seek an Independent Counsel only where there is a good affirmative rea-
son to do so. The law should direct an Attorney General to trigger an Inde-
pendent Counsel appointment when, in her judgment, the Department of
Justice has something like "substantial and credible evidence of criminal
conduct of a type that is prosecuted by the Department of Justice." In other
words, the law should direct the Attorney General to seek an Independent
Counsel when she can say "this is a real thing," and it should free her not to
seek the appointment when she cannot. Independent counsel investigations
are not the places, and Independent Counsel are not the right prosecutors,
to decide that our federal criminal statutes should be used in new or novel
ways.
Fifth, Congress should make it plain that the Attorney General can pull
the Independent Counsel trigger at any time. There reportedly has been
considerable debate in the current Department of Justice about how to read
the existing statute, which is poorly written in this regard. The debate has
concerned whether the law's conflict of interest provision38 permits an At-
36. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1) (1994).
37. See id. § 592(c)(i).
38. See id. ("When the Attorney General determines that an investigation or prosecu-
tion of a person by the Department of Justice may result in a personal, financial or political
conflict of interest, the Attorney General may conduct a preliminary investigation of such
person in accordance with section 592 if the Attorney General receives information suffi-
cient to constitute grounds to investigate whether that person may have violated Federal
criminal law other than a violation classified as a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infrac-
tion."). Although this provision was rewritten as enacted in the 1994 statute, the 1987 ver-
sion of the Independent Counsel law that preceded it contained a provision that was sub-
stantively the same. From 1978-1987, the first two Independent Counsel laws stated
explicitly that the Attorney General could conduct a preliminary investigation and apply for
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torney General only to skip past the initial and quick stage at which she
must assess the specificity and credibility of the allegations that a covered
person has committed federal crime 39 into the preliminary investigation
(which is what the current provision says literally),4° or whether it also
permits her to skip or truncate the law's other procedures and move all the
way to pulling the trigger that will produce an Independent Counsel ap-
pointment (which is how some previous Attorneys General were authorized
to act under earlier versions of the Independent Counsel statute).41 The law
should state unambiguously that the Attorney General may, in her discre-
tion, pull the trigger at any time and for any reason.
Sixth, Congress should change the judicial selection process. We cur-
rently have the Chief Justice picking three Circuit Judges for two-year
terms by no standard in a process that has no accountability.4 2 Early on,
this statute was in the hands of the so-called Eisenhower Department of
Justice veterans. Some of the protagonists included Chief Justice Warren
Burger, Judge George MacKinnon, Judge Walter Mansfield, former Judge
Lawrence Walsh and distinguished private attorney Leon Silverman. It
was, quite visibly, an "old boys' network" of former colleagues and, in
some instances, personal friends. It was the nation's good fortune that,
throughout their distinguished careers, these men had "the right stuff," in-
cluding in the days when they began to create the Independent Counsel
law's heritage.
The cast of characters began to change when Chief Justice Rehnquist in
1991 replaced Judge MacKinnon as the presiding judge of the Special Di-
vision for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsel with his D.C.
Circuit colleague Judge David B. Sentelle. In July 1994, the so-called
"prostate problems" lunch brought Judge Sentelle together with North
Carolina Senators Jesse Helms and Lauch Faircloth. This lunch occurred
just as the Special Division that Judge Sentelle led was considering Attor-
ney General Reno's request that it appoint her Whitewater Special Prose-
cutor Robert Fiske to be the Whitewater Independent Counsel under the
an Independent Counsel appointment if he determined that he or another officer of the De-
partment of Justice investigating a particular person might result in a personal, financial or
political conflict of interest. See Historical and Statutory Notes, following 28 U.S.C.A. §
591, at 214-15 (1993).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(d).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(c)(1).
41. See supra note 38.
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 49. This arrangement generally follows a 1974 recomrmendation
of the Senate Watergate Committee. See supra note 2, at 99 ("The Chief Justice should be
given the power and duty to select three retired circuit court judges who, in turn, would ap-
point the public attorney.").
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newly enacted 1994 statute.43 At that time, Fiske's Department of Justice
investigation of President Clinton and others had been criticized by many
of the President's political opponents, including Senators Faircloth and
Helms. Shortly thereafter, Judge Sentelle and his Special Division col-
leagues decided that Fiske should be replaced by an Independent Counsel
not of the Attorney General's choosing and appointed former Judge Ken-
neth W. Starr to be the Whitewater Independent Counsel. Critics then
pointed to the lunch as support for their claims that the Special Division is
in league with President Clinton's enemies.
We should get rid of at least some of the corrosive speculation that a
Chief Justice and/or one or more of the Judges he selects to serve in the
Special Division try to accomplish partisan political objectives as they ex-
ercise their responsibilities under the Independent Counsel law. A new law
could prescribe that three Chief Judges from the federal Circuits would
henceforth be selected randomly to serve for fixed terms as the panel to
pick Independent Counsel if and when the Attorney General makes an ap-
pointment request during their tenure. A court official could run this selec-
tion process just like "Lotto": a drum containing thirteen numbered ping
pong balls would spin, and up would pop three indicating which Circuit
Chiefs would take on this task. The administrative apparatus of the Special
Division could remain in the District of Columbia, which has been the pri-
mary venue of most matters that Independent Counsel have investigated, as
a collateral responsibility of the Clerk for the D.C. Circuit.
Seventh, the law should require, or at least strongly encourage, the Spe-
cial Division to pick future Independent Counsel from a roster that is pre-
approved by the Attorney General of the United States. Who knows where
today's Independent Counsel come from? We know that Walsh, et al.,
came from Judge MacKinnon, who came from Chief Justice Burger, who
came from President Nixon, who once worked for President Eisenhower,
who once employed Walsh, MacKinnon and Burger in his Department of
Justice, and so on. Some of the later Independent Counsel have been, at
their appointments, less well-known and less well-credentialed for work in
delicate, high-level matters of federal law enforcement. As a result, they
have been criticized for prosecutorial inexperience, suspected of political
cronyism, made mistakes of judgment, and so forth. Who needs it?
If the Independent Counsel law instead required the Attorney General
once every year - it could be on January first,-or July fourth, or whatever
symbolism we wanted - to give to the Special Division the names of fif-
teen or so experienced, available, living people who would thereby become
43. See generally Peter M. Ryan, Counsels, Councils and Lunch: Preventing Abuse of
the Power to Appoint Independent Counsels, 144 U. PENN. L. REv. 2537 (1996).
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eligible for any Independent Counsel appointment the court needed to
make in the next twelve month period, and then the next year to submit an
updated list of fifteen names (replacing the deceased and so forth), we
would know that any Independent Counsel who later was appointed came
from the executive branch with the imprimatur of federal law enforcement.
Eighth, the law should bind the Special Division to the jurisdictional re-
quest of the Attorney General. There should be no tinkering by the Special
Division around the edges - and certainly no expansion of an "Iran arms
sales and diversion of funds therefrom" into "Iran/Contra," for instance,
which is what the court did to Attorney General Meese's request in De-
cember 1986.44 If the Attorney General asks for an Independent Counsel to
be appointed with particular investigative responsibilities, the law should
require the court to give her exactly what she asked for.
Ninth, Congress should eliminate the statutory provision that permits the
Special Division to expand an Independent Counsel's investigative juris-
diction notwithstanding the objections of the Attorney General.4 5 Even if
such a conferral of jurisdiction would be constitutional, the statute should
not encourage Independent Counsel to avoid dealing with attorneys gen-
eral, nor should it allow attorneys general to avoid taking full political heat
for the impact they produce when they say no to Independent Counsel re-
quests for expanded jurisdiction, by holding out this possibility.
Tenth, abolish the impeachment reporting requirement.46 Identifying
and explaining what may constitute grounds for an impeachment is prop-
erly the job of Congress, not an Independent Counsel. Iran/Contra, for ex-
ample, had congressional select committees that found facts, did their
44. On December 4, 1986, Attorney General Meese applied to the Special Division for
an Independent Counsel to investigate whether Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, other United States
Government officials, or other individuals acting in concert with any of them violated fed-
eral criminal laws "from in or around January 1985 . . . to the present, in connection with the
sale or shipment of military arms to Iran and the transfer or diversion of funds realized in
connection with such sale or shipment." Application of the Attorney General Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §592(c)(1) for the Appointment of an Independent Counsel Regarding Iranian Arms
Shipments and Diversion of Funds at 1 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div., filed Dec. 4, 1986) (No. 86-6).
Two weeks later, the Special Division, after first reciting the Attorney General's application
verbatim, appointed Lawrence E. Walsh to investigate whether North and others committed
any crimes relating to a wider range of matters, including "the provision or coordination of
support for persons or entities engaged as military insurgents in armed conflict with the
Government of Nicaragua since 1984 .. " Order, In re Oliver L. North at 1-2 (D.C. Cir.
Spec. Div. Dec. 19, 1986) (per curiam).
45. See supra notes 18 - 20 and accompanying text.
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) ("An Independent Counsel shall advise the House of Repre-
sentatives of any substantial and credible information which such Independent Counsel re-
ceives, in carrying out the Independent Counsel's responsibilities under this chapter, that
may constitute grounds for an impeachment.").
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work, and took whatever approach they believed justified regarding the
conduct of executive branch officials who were subject to impeachment. 7
In other words, Congress took its impeachment shot, or it did not, but in
any case it chose and thus bore constitutional responsibility for what it did
and did not pursue. The Independent Counsel statute should not, even indi-
rectly, allow Congress to farm out to any Independent Counsel its respon-
sibility for executive branch oversight, and then to wait and see if the Inde-
pendent Counsel shows up with adverse information and calls it possible
grounds for impeachment.
Eleventh, narrow the final report requirement. Professor Ken Gormley,
in his recent article, spells out very nicely how that can be done.48 The law
could require a short report of the "what we did, what we spent, and then
we went home" format.
Twelfth, require Independent Counsel in known investigations to an-
nounce their prosecution declination/investigation closure decisions as they
make them.
And finally, thirteenth, Congress should abolish the attorney fee reim-
bursement provision.49 Through decisions of the Special Division, the cur-
rent law has delivered a lot of professional welfare payments to the white
collar criminal and government official defense bars of Washington, D.C.50
It has become a trough that lawyers seek to feed in. And the prospect of
this ultimate reimbursement from the government seems to have encour-
aged all kinds of "lawyering up," often orchestrated by White House Coun-
sel. It prolongs and complicates Independent Counsel investigations when
even the most minor potential witnesses are represented by counsel who
look forward to reimbursement. And this provision obviously increases the
public tab for an Independent Counsel's work. A better system would be
for Congress itself to make reimbursement decisions after investigations
and prosecutions have concluded. When it turns out that someone sympa-
thetic has reasonably incurred and actually paid a huge legal bill because of
the Independent Counsel statute, then private legislation can and should
bail them out, as it did the head of the White House Travel Office for some
47. See generally S. REP. No. 100-216; H.R. REP. No. 100-433 (Report of the congres-
sional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair, with supplemental, minority, and ad-
ditional views).
48. See Gormley, supra note 11, at 675-78.
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(f); see generally Kathleen Clark, Paying the Price for Height-
ened Ethics Scrutiny: Legal Defense Funds and Other Ways That Government Officials Pay
Their Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 65, 80-86 (1997).
50. See Clark, supra note 49, at 130-32, Table II ("Legal Expenses Reimbursed under
Independent Counsel Statute").
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bills he incurred defending himself against a Department of Justice prose-
cution.
51
Those ideas add up to a prescription to continue the Independent Coun-
sel law in a much more cautious way, preserving the value of an independ-
ent investigative option that can serve the nation well in extraordinary
situations.
51. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriation Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 526,
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1 (10 Stat.) 3009 (appropriating $500,000 for legal expenses of Billy
Dale, the former head of White House Travel Office who had been fired, indicted, prose-
cuted and acquitted, and five other former Travel Office employees).
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